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The Idaho Trial Lawyers Association Foundation ("Foundation") respectfully submits this 
Brief as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant in accordance with the Court's Order dated June 5, 
2012. 
I. IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
The Idaho Trial Lawyers Association ("ITLA") formed the Foundation to provide 
independent and scholarly assistance to Idaho's courts through amicus briefing on issues of public 
interest. The Foundation seeks to participate in cases involving novel issues of law which further 
access to the justice system, preserve the constitutional right to trial by jury, and generally promote 
the common good. The Foundation filed a Motion for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curiae in this 
case because it involves a novel issue of law which is of substantial interest to ITLA members and 
the trial bar. The Foundation is concerned that the position adopted by the Industrial Commission 
is inconsistent with the plain language of I. C. § 72-223(3) and may impede access to the justice 
system and enable people who are responsible for injuries to escape liability. For these reasons, the 
Foundation urges the Court to reverse the Industrial Commission's decision and remand this case 
with instructions to allocate Mr. Izaguirre's settlement proceeds among the various categories of 
damages supported by the evidence and recalculate the credit the surety is to receive against future 
compensation benefits. 
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II. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
When reviewing Industrial Commission decisions, this Court exercises free review over 
questions of law. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). The 
construction of a statute is a question oflaw. Idaho State Ins. Fund v. Van Tine, 132 Idaho 902, 905-
06, 980 P.2d 566, 569-70 (1999). Because this case involves the construction and application of 
I. C. § 72-223(3), this Court should freely review the Industrial Commission's decision. 
B. Subection 72-223(3) Limits a Surety's Right to Subrogation from Amounts Allocated 
for Losses Covered by Workers Compensation. 
The Industrial Commission ruled that the entire settlement received by Mr. Izaguirre is 
subject to Zurich American Insurance Co.'s right of subrogation. (SeeR., p. 109 at, 47). The 
Commission's ruling misses the mark because it: (1) is inconsistent with the plain language ofl.C. 
§ 72-223(3); (2) misconstrues this Court's decisions in Struhs v. Prot. Technologies, Inc., 133 Idaho 
715,992 P.2d 164, 170(1999)and Cameron v. Minidoka Highway District, 125 Idaho 801,874 P.2d 
1108 (1994); (3) is inconsistent with the policies behind subrogation; and ( 4) may impede access to 
the justice system and enable responsible tortfeasors to escape liability. 
1. The plain language of subsection 72-223(3) supports Mr. Izaguirre's request for 
allocation. 
The question to be decided by this Court is whether I.C. § 72-223(3) gives a worker's 
compensation surety the right to recover all of the proceeds of a third party settlement. To answer 
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this question, the analysis must begin with the language of the statute itself. This Court has long 
held that where a statute is plain, clear and unambiguous, it speaks for itself and must be given the 
interpretation the language clearly implies. Moon v. Investment Bd., 97 Idaho 595, 596, 548 P.2d 
861, 862 (1976). 
Subsection 72-223(3) ofthe Idaho Code is the provision which grants an employer (or its 
surety) who has paid worker's compensation benefits the right to "subrogation." It states: 
If compensation has been claimed and awarded, the employer having paid such 
compensation or having become liable therefor, shall be subrogated to the rights of 
the employee, to recover against such third party to the extent of the employer's 
compensation liability. 
I.C. § 72-223(3) (emphasis added). "Subrogation is the substitution of one person in the place of 
another with reference to a legal right." Presnell v. Kelly, 113 Idaho 1, 3, 740 P.2d 43,45 (1987). 
"Black's Law Dictionary defines subrogation as 'The right of one who has paid an obligation which 
another should have paid to be indemnified by the other."' I d. 
The surety's right to subrogation is not unfettered under I.C. § 72-223(3). The language 
emphasized above is an important limitation on the right of subrogation. The surety only has a right 
of subrogation to the extent of the worker's compensation liability (i.e., benefits it has paid or will 
pay in the future). In other words, the surety can only recover the monies paid for losses covered 
by worker's compensation. There is nothing in the plain language that grants the surety the right to 
recover its interests from monies awarded to the claimant for losses not covered by worker's 
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compensation (e.g., lost wages not covered by worker's compensation, pain and suffering). Damages 
for uncovered losses belong to the employee. 
The importance of the language emphasized above can be seen when comparing section 72-
223(3) as it exists now with the right of subrogation that a worker's compensation surety had in the 
past. This Court addressed the extent of a surety's right of subrogation in Hall v. Young's Dairy 
Products Co., 98 Idaho 562, 569 P .2d 907 (1977). In Hall, the surety's right of subrogation was 
governed by I. C.§ 72-204 which existed at that time. Section 72-204 stated: 
When an injury for which compensation is payable under this act shall have been 
sustained under circumstances creating in some other person than the employer a 
legal liability to pay damages in respect thereto, the injured employee may, at his 
option, either claim compensation under this act or obtain damages from or proceed 
at law against such other person to recover damages; and if compensation is claimed 
and awarded under this act any employer having paid the compensation or having 
become liable therefor shall be subrogated to the rights of the injured employee to 
recover against that person; provided if the employer shall recover from such other 
person damages in excess of the compensation already paid or awarded to be paid 
under this act, then any such excess shall be paid to the injured employee less the 
employer's expenses and costs of action. 
See Hall, 98 Idaho at 563-64, 569 P.2d 908-09 (emphasis added) (quoting I.C. § 72-204). Section 
72-204 granted the surety an unlimited right to subrogation. The surety had the right to pursue the 
third party tortfeasor and recover all of the damages sustained by the surety and the employee. The 
employee was entitled to compensation only if there was an excess award. It was clear from the 
statute that the employer got the first and last dollar of any recovery if it was necessary to satisfY the 
subrogated interest. 
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Today's statutory scheme is much different. Today, the surety does not have an unlimited 
subrogated interest. It can only step into the shoes of the employee to recover what it has paid or will 
pay in the future. Damages for uncovered losses belong to the employee. 
It is evident that the Idaho legislature understands how to create a statutory scheme that 
grants an unfettered right of subrogation. Another example of an unfettered subrogation right is 
found in the Medicaid statutes. For years, the Department of Health and Welfare was entitled to the 
first dollar and last dollar of a third party recovery if necessary to recover its subrogated interest 
under the Medicaid program. See I. C. § 56-209b(3)-( 6). The language used to create the subrogation 
interest under the worker's compensation system today and the Medicaid system are substantially 
similar: 
Worker's Compensation Medicaid 
If compensation has been claimed and awarded, In all cases where the department of health and 
the employer having paid such compensation or welfare through the medical assistance program 
having become liable therefor, shall be has or will be required to pay medical expenses 
subrogated to the rights of the em12loyee. to for a recipient and that recipient is entitled to 
recover l!gainst such third party to the extent of recover any or all such medical expenses from 
the em12loyer' s com12ensation liabili:ty. any third party or entity, the department of 
health and welfare will be subrogated to the 
rights of the reci12ient to the extent of the 
amount of medical assistance benefits 12aid by 
the department as the result of the occurrence 
giving rise to the claim against the third party 
or entity. 
I.C. § 72-223(3) (emphasis added). I.C. § 56-290b(3) (emphasis added). 
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The Medicaid subrogation statute does not end, however, with subsection (3 ). The legislature 
enacted additional provisions making it clear and unambiguous that the Department of Health and 
Welfare is entitled to recover the first and last dollar of any third party settlement. Section 56-
209b( 4) provided: 
In addition if the recipient recovers funds, either by settlement or judgment, from 
such a third party or entity, the recipient shall reimburse the department to the extent 
of the funds received in settlement minus attorney's fees and costs, the amount of 
the medical assistance benefits paid by the department on his behalf as a result of the 
occurrence giving rise to the need for medical assistance. 
* * * 
I.C. § 56-209b(4) (emphasis added). 
Section 56-209(b)(5) also provided: 
The department shall have priority to any amount received from a third party or 
entity which can reasonably be construed to compensate the recipient for the 
occurrence giving rise to the need for medical assistance, whether the settlement or 
judgment is obtained through the subrogation right of the department or through 
recovery by the recipient, and whether or not the recipient is made whole by the 
amount recovered. The department will be entitled to reimbursement of medical 
assistance benefits paid on behalf of the recipient arising from the incident or 
occurrence prior to any amount being distributed to the recipient. 
* * * 
I.C. § 56-209b(5) (emphasis added). 
The Medicaid subrogation statute even has a provision making it clear that if a settlement or 
judgment is received without an allocation, then it is presumed that the settlement or judgment 
applies first to the medical expenses paid by the Department of Health and Welfare. Section 56-
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209b(6) states in relevant part: 
* * * 
If a settlement or judgment is received by the recipient without delineating what 
portion of the settlement or judgment is in payment of medical expenses, it will be 
presumed that the settlement or judgment applies first to the medical expenses 
incurred by the recipient in an amount equal to the expenditure for medical assistance 
benefits paid by the department as a result of the occurrence giving rise to the 
payment or payments to the recipient. 
I.C. § 56-209b(6). 
The Foundation recognizes that the Supreme Court of the United States' decision in 
Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 126 S.Ct. 1752 (2006) invalidated the 
Department's practice of recovering its subrogated interests from moneys allocated to a Medicaid 
recipient for losses other than medical expenses (e.g., property damage, lost wages, pain and 
suffering). See Dept of Health and Welfare v. Hudelson, 146 Idaho 439, 196 P.3d 905 (2008). 
Provisions enabling a Medicaid program to attach damages belonging to a plaintiff violate 
Medicaid's prohibition against placing a lien on a participant's personal property. See id. at 444-45, 
196 P.3d at 910-11 (discussing federal anti-lien provisions). While subsections 56-209b(4) and 56-
209b(5) are now essentially invalid, the point being made here remains the same -the Idaho 
legislature understands how to draft a statute which clearly and unambiguously grants a subrogation 
right which extends to the first and last dollar of a third party recovery. The legislature has not done 
that in I.C. § 72-223 or any other provision of the worker's compensation laws. The worker's 
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compensation laws do not contain a functional equivalent of subsections 56-209b( 4)- (6). Because 
the surety's subrogation right is limited to damages for losses covered by worker's compensation, 
this case should be remanded to the Industrial Commission with instructions to allocate the 
settlement proceeds among covered and non-covered losses which are supported by the evidence 
(e.g., past medical expenses, future medical expenses, past lost wages, future lost wages, pain and 
suffering) and to recalculate the credit to which the surety is entitled under subsection 72-223(5). 
2. The Industrial Commission's analysis ofStruhs and Cameron misses the mark. 
The Industrial Commission found that this Court's decision in Struhs v. Prot. Technologies, 
Inc., 133 Idaho 715, 992 P .2d 164, 170 (1999) is controlling precedent and required the Commission 
to rule that the surety's subrogated interest extends to all of the settlement proceeds received by Mr. 
Izaguirre. (R., pp. 106-109). In Struhs, the claimant was injured in a car accident. His worker's 
compensation surety paid approximately $22,000 in benefits. The claimant settled his claim with 
the third party for $45,000 and signed a settlement agreement which stated that the benefits were 
payment for "general damages"- a category of damages which does not correspond to any of the 
benefits payable under Idaho's worker's compensation laws. Neither the employee nor his attorney 
told the surety about the settlement, and the surety only learned of it after contacting the attorney to 
find out what had happened to the claim. The employee filed a worker's compensation claim against 
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the surety, and the surety essentially made a counter-claim against the employee and his attorney to 
recover its subrogated interest. 
In construing Struhs in this case, the Industrial Commission held: 
In the context of the question of whether or not a portion of the proceeds of a third 
party settlement are not subject to the I. C. § 72-223 right of subrogation, Struhs is 
just as important for what is does not say, as what it says. Having specifically 
found that the claimant in Struhs could not affect the surety's right of subrogation by 
incorporating certain language into the third party settlement to which surety was not 
a party, the Court concluded that the language of the agreement must be ignored, and 
that surety's right of subrogation was deemed to extend to the entire third party 
recovery. Had the Court been ofthe view that LC. § 72-223limited surety's right 
of subrogation to that portion of the proceeds of a third party recovery which 
corresponded to worker's compensation benefits paid, it would, presumably, have 
found it necessary to remand the matter to the Commission for further proceedings 
along the lines of the inquiries which are before the Commission in the instant 
matter. That the Court did not do this in Struhs, is telling, and consistent with the 
plain language ofi.C. § 72-223(3) .... 
(R., p. 107-08,, 43). 
The Industrial Commission's reading of Struhs goes too far. This Court did not conclude 
anywhere in the Struhs decision that the "surety's right of subrogation was deemed to extend to the 
entire third party recovery." The Struhs court addressed a very narrow subrogation issue which it 
characterized as: " It is a matter of first impression before this Court whether an agreement between 
a third-party tortfeasor and an injured employee can restrict the employer's subrogation rights." 
Struhs, 133 Idaho at 170-71, 992 P.2d at 170. The Industrial Commission "presumed" that the 
Struhs case addressed the extent of the surety's subrogated interest, but this presumption cannot 
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logically be made since the settlement at issue was for $45,000 and the amount the surety was 
seeking was approximately $22,000. The surety was not seeking the entire settlement and did not 
appear to be seeking any type of credit for future benefits. In addition, there is no information 
contained in the opinion as to whether Struhs argued for an allocation like Mr. Izaguirre has done 
in this case. The Industrial Commission's "presumption" misses the mark. 
Similarly, the Industrial Commission's reliance on Cameron v. Minidoka Highway District, 
125 Idaho 801, 874 P.3d 1108 (1994) is misplaced. In Cameron, the claimants and the surety 
actually stipulated and agreed that the third party settlement received by the Camerons extinguished 
the surety's obligation to pay future benefits. The only issue that was addressed in Cameron was the 
surety's liability for attorney's fees on the benefits that it saved as a result of the third party 
settlement. The Cameron decision had nothing to do with the extent of the surety's subrogated 
interest in the settlement funds. Furthermore, the Cameron decision no longer appears to have any 
substantive precedential value since the legislature enacted LC. § 72-223(5) in 1999 in an apparent 
response to the decision. Subsection 72-223(5) makes it clear that a surety does not have to pay any 
costs or fees at the time a credit for future benefits is claimed. Rather, the credit is applied and costs 
and fees are owed when the future benefit becomes payable unless there is another agreement 
between the parties. See House Bill No. 1035 with Statement of Purpose attached hereto as 
Appendix 1. Because the Industrial Commission's interpretations of Struhs and Cameron do not 
support its decision, this case should be remanded with instructions to allocate the settlement 
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proceeds among covered and non-covered losses and to recalculate the credit to which the surety is 
entitled under subsection 72-223(5). 
3. Mr. Izaguirre's position is consistent with the purpose of subrogation. 
The Industrial Commission held that if it adopted Mr. Izaguirre's position it would frustrate 
the purpose ofl.C. § 72-223(3). (R., p. 108-09, ~ 45). This Court has explained that "[t]he purpose 
of legal subrogation is to work out an equitable adjustment between parties by assuring that the 
discharge of an obligation be paid by the person who in equity and good conscience ought to pay it. 
An additional purpose of subrogation for third party liability is to prevent the injured claimant from 
obtaining a double recovery for an injury." See Presnell v. Kelly, 113 Idaho 1, 3, 740 P.2d 43, 45 
( 1987) (citations omitted). The Industrial Commission's conclusion is inconsistent with this Court's 
stated purpose of subrogation. 
Unlike the situation in Struhs, Mr. Izaguirre is not seeking to thwart the surety's subrogated 
interest. Mr. Izaguirre has already reimbursed the surety more than $32,000 and actually paid 
approximately $4,000 more than what he was legally required to pay (R., p. 115, ~ 62). Mr. 
Izaguirre requested that the Commission allocate his settlement proceeds among the various 
categories of damages, including general damages for pain and suffering. His position is that any 
money allocated for pain and suffering should be not be used as a credit against future benefits owed 
by the surety because the pain and suffering damages belong to him. Instead, the surety's subrogated 
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interest should be limited to amounts allocated for items such as future medical expenses and future 
lost wages. Mr. Izaguirre's position is consistent with the purpose of the subrogation statute. It will 
not result in a "double recovery" because he is only keeping those damages that belong to him. 
Moreover, the responsible party has been held accountable for the injuries Mr. Izaguirre sustained. 
The Industrial Commission also concluded that its ruling would encourage resolution of 
subrogated interests at the "front end" of a case (i.e., at the time of the resolution of the third party 
claim), as it should be. (R., p. 109, ~ 46). The Industrial Commission stated: 
In so ruling, we recognize that claimant and surety may, of course, make their own 
agreement concerning the allocation of the proceeds of a third party settlement. 
Disputes of the type currently before the Commission could be avoided by 
encouraging claimants and subrogated sureties to address whether and/or how the 
proceeds of a third party recovery are to be allocated, contemporaneous with the 
settlement of the third party claim. If claimant and the subrogated carrier cannot 
come to agreement, then perhaps the third party settlement will be impeded. 
However, that is preferable to avoiding the issue, settling the third party case, and 
trusting the Industrial Commission to ascertain how the proceeds of a third party 
settlement of a personal injury claim should be allocated to special and general 
damages, and whether the settlement corresponds to workers' compensation benefits 
paid." 
(R., p. 109, ~ 46). 
The overwhelming question that this statement brings to mind is: "Why would any worker's 
compensation surety be willing to agree to an allocation of damages if the entirety of the settlement 
fund is subject to the surety's subrogated interest?" There is no incentive whatsoever for the surety 
to concede to any type of allocation. The surety is much better off simply accepting repayment of 
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the past amounts paid and then sitting back and waiting to see if any future benefits may be owed. 
If future benefits are owed, the surety can then claim that the entire settlement is subject to the credit 
and obtain the maximum financial benefit. 
The Industrial Commission's ruling does not promote the efficient settlement of claims. 
To the contrary, it impedes them. If the surety is entitled to the first and last dollar of a settlement, 
it has little incentive to compromise. Similarly, a claimant who is likely to receive little or nothing 
from a settlement is actually encouraged to "roll the dice" with a jury even when the facts of a case 
do not justify doing so. While the Foundation strongly supports our system of trial by jury, the 
reality is that litigants, lawyers and judges alike all have a strong interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 
286, 292 (1980). The Industrial Commission's ruling does not further that goal. 
Although the Industrial Commission contends that it is "ill-equipped" and "disinclined" to 
undertake the allocation of settlement proceeds, it is important to recognize that the Commission 
performed this function admirably when it allocated that portion of the settlement proceeds which 
belongs to Mrs. Izaguirre on account of her loss of consortium claim. The Industrial Commission 
has far more experience than any jury when it comes to evaluating the impact of injuries and the 
types of damages that can and should be awarded. Because the position advocated by Mr. Izaguirre 
is consistent with the purpose ofl.C. § 72-223(3) and the Industrial Commission is well-suited for 
allocating damages, the Court should reverse the Industrial Commission's decision and remand this 
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case with instructions to allocate the settlement proceeds and recalculate the credit to which the 
surety is entitled under subsection 72-223(5). 
4. The Industrial Commission's ruling may impede access to the legal system and 
result in responsible tortfeasors escaping liability. 
If this Court were to affirm the Industrial Commission's decision, it may have a chilling 
effect on tort claims. If the rule is that a worker's compensation surety has aright to the first and last 
dollar of a recovery, it means that an attorney must evaluate whether he can actually put any money 
in a client's pocket before he takes the case. If the claimant has significant medical expenses that 
have been paid by the surety and there is a substantial likelihood of either no recovery or a small 
recovery from the third party (e.g., small liability policy, third part insolvency), a responsible, 
competent attorney will likely find himself in the position of turning the client down because the 
potential recovery does not justify the time, effort or expense of litigation. In this type of situation, 
the only winner is the third party who caused the injury. It means injured parties may not find 
competent counsel to represent them, claims may not be brought and tortfeasors may not be held 
responsible. Public policy justifies the type of allocation that Mr. Izaguirre is proposing. His 
approach is reasonable and consistent with the dual purposes of subrogation. Because the Industrial 
Commission is well-situated to allocate the proceeds of a personal injury settlement in a case where 
an agreement cannot be reached and because allocation furthers the purposes of subrogation, this 
case should be remanded to the Industrial Commission with instructions to allocate the proceeds of 
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Mr. Izaguirre's settlement and recalculate the credit to which the surety is entitled under subsection 
72-223(5). 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the Idaho Trial Lawyers Association Foundation as Amicus Curiae 
urges this Court to reverse the Industrial Commission's ruling and remand this case with instructions 
to apportion Mr. Izaguirre's settlement proceeds and recalculate the credit the surety is to receive 
against future compensation benefits. 
;{ 
DATED this ./.L:_ day of June, 2012. 
. Brody 
ounsel for Amicus Curiae 
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I I I I LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO I I I I 
Fifty-fifth Legislature First Regular Session - 1999 
IN THE SENATE 
SENATE BILL NO. 1035 
BY COMMERCE AND HUMAN RESOURCES COMMITTEE 
1 AN ACT 
Page 2 of4 
2 RELATING TO WORKER'S COMPENSATION; AMENDING SECTION 72-223, IDAHO CODE, TO 
3 PROVIDE THAT AN EMPLOYER SHALL RECEIVE A CREDIT AGAINST ITS FUTURE LIABIL-
4 ITY FOR COMPENSATION BENEFITS IF THE AMOUNT RECOVERED FROM A THIRD PARTY 
5 EXCEEDS THE AMOUNT OF THE SUBROGATED PORTION PAYABLE TO THE EMPLOYER FOR 
6 PAST COMPENSATION BENEFITS PAID AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE EMPLOYER'S REIM-
7 BURSEMENT TO THE EMPLOYEE OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS PAID BY THE 
8 EMPLOYEE IN OBTAINING THAT PORTION OF THE THIRD PARTY RECOVERY CORRESPOND-
9 ING TO THE CREDIT CLAIMED. 
10 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
11 SECTION 1. That Section 72-223, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
12 amended to read as follows: 
13 72-223. THIRD PARTY LIABILITY. (1) The right to compensation under this 
14 law shall not be affected by the fact that the injury, occupational disease or 
15 death is caused under circumstances creating in some person other than the 
16 employer a legal liability to pay damages therefor, such person so liable 
17 being referred to as the third party. Such third party shall not include those 
18 employers described in section 72-216, Idaho Code, having under them contrac-
19 tors or subcontractors who have in fact complied with the provisions of sec-
20 tion 72-301, Idaho Code; nor include the owner or lessee of premises, or other 
21 person who is virtually the proprietor or operator of the business there car-
22 ried on, but who, by reason of there being an independent contractor or for 
23 any other reason, is not the direct employer of the workmen there employed. 
24 (2) Action may be instituted against such third party by the employee, or 
25 in event compensation has been claimed and awarded, by the employee and 
26 employer jointly, in the employee's name, or, if the employee refuses to par-
27 ticipate in such action, by the employer in the employee's name. 
28 (3) If compensation has been claimed and awarded, the employer having 
29 paid such compensation or having become liable therefor, shall be subrogated 
30 to the rights of the employee, to recover against such third party to the 
31 extent of the employer's compensation liability. 
32 (4) On any recovery by the employee against a third party, the employer 
33 shall pay or have deducted from his subrogated portion thereof, a proportion-
34 ate share of the costs and attorney's fees incurred by the employee in obtain-
35 ing such recovery. 
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36 (5) If the amount recovered from the third party exceeds the amount 
37 of the subrogated portion payable to the employer for past compensation bene-
38 fits paid, then to the extent the employer has a future subrogated interest in 
39 that portion of the third party recovery paid to the employee, the employer 
40 shall receive a credit against its future liability for compensation benefits. 
41 Such credit shall apply as future compensation benefits become payable, and 
42 the employer shall reimburse the employee for the proportionate share of 
43 attorney's fees and costs paid by the employee in obtaining that portion of 
2 
1 the third party recovery corresponding to the credit claimed. The employer 
2 shall not be required to pay such attorney's fees and costs related to the 
3 future credit prior to the time the credit is claimed. However, the employer 
4 and employee may agree to different terms if approved by the industrial com-
5 mission. 
6 (6) If death results from the injury or occupational disease and 
7 if the employee leaves no dependents entitled to benefits under this law, the 
8 surety shall have a right of action against the third party for recovery of 
9 income benefits, reasonable expenses of medical and related services and 
10 burial expense actually paid by the surety and for recovery of amounts paid 
11 into the industrial special indemnity account pursuant to section 72-420, 
12 Idaho Code, and such right of action shall be in addition to any cause of 
13 action of the heirs or personal representatives of the deceased. 
14 (-u-_2_) All rights and restrictions herein granted 
15 to the employer have previously been intended to be, and are hereby expressly 
16 granted to the industrial special indemnity account. 
Statement of Purpose I Fiscal Impact 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS 08581C1 
There are some workers, compensation cases that involve a 
third party whose actions were the cause of an accident and 
injury to a worker. If the injured worker is successful in 
recovering damages from the third party, the surety/employer 
also has a right to recover any workers' compensation 
liability they incur as a result of the accident. At the time 
the surety/employer receives their recovery for monies already 
paid out in benefits, they are obligated to pay a portion of 
the injured worker's attorneys fees which made the recovery 
possible. The portion of fees the surety/employer must pay is 
based on the amount of their recovery. 
Because there are often future expenses associated with the 
injury, the surety/employer will have to pay their share of 
attorney's fees based on the amount of any future recovery. 
Today, they are required to pay these fees in advance, based 
on an estimate of future recovery. This bill will require the 
surety/employer to pay at the time they receive the recovery. 
FISCAL IMPACT 
There will be no fiscal impact to the General Fund. 
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Name: Dawn Justice, VP Human Resources 
Organization: Idaho Association of Commerce and Industry 
Phone: 343-1849 
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